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I. INTRODUCTION
n 1975, the United States Congress passed, and President Ford signed
into law, the Education for All Handicapped Children Act (hereinafter
the Act or EAHCA).1 The key provision of the Act was that each
handicapped child was entitled to a Free and Appropriate Public Educa-
tion (hereinafter FAPE). 2 Congress provided extensive procedural pro-
* Professor of Law, University of Richmond. B.A. 1973, University of Michigan; J.D.
1976, Wayne State University; LL.M. 1980, Temple University. Member, New Hampshire
and Virginia Bars. The author wishes to express his appreciation to the Faculty Research
Committee of the University of Richmond and the Virginia Law Foundation for their
support in writing this Article. The author also thanks William Klare for his helpful
comments.
1 20 U.S.C §§ 1401-61 (1982).
2 Id. § 1412(2)(B).
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tections to ensure that the school authorities provided children with a
FAPE.3 The extensive procedural protections included parental partici-
pation in most decisions affecting the child's educational program.4
As a means of enforcing these parental rights and agency responsibil-
ities, Congress mandated that each State Education Authority (herein-
after SEA) create an administrative due process hearing mechanism.5
Congress then provided for review of that administrative procedure by
either a state or federal court.6
Virtually every important educational decision affecting the child's
program can lead to a dispute, which in turn can lead to a due process
hearing and judicial proceedings.7 The ultimate decision, whether made
by the Local Education Authority (hereinafter LEA), SEA, the due
process hearing officer, or a judge, is ultimately determined, in large
measure, by the allocation of the burden of proof and the willingness of
one participant in the process (hearing officer, judge, parent, SEA, or
LEA) to defer or not to other participants. Yet, among the most perplex-
ing evidentiary and procedural issues, given judicial interpretation of the
due process requirements and the specificity of the due process protec-
3 Id. §§ 1412(5)(B)-(C), 1415.
4 Id. § 1414(a)(1)(c)(iii), 1415(b)(1).
5 Id. § 1415(b)(2).
6 Id. § 1415(e).
7 Id. § 1415(b)(2), (e). The United States Supreme Court first had occasion to interpret
the Act in Hendrick Hudson Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176 (1982). In Rowley,
the Court addressed two issues: "What is meant by the Act's requirement of a 'free and
appropriate education'? And what is the role of state and federal courts in exercising the
review granted by 20 U.S.C. § 1415?" Id. at 186. Two years later in Smith v. Robinson, 468
U.S. 992 (1984), the Court addressed whether the EAHCA was intended by Congress to be
the exclusive remedy or whether aggrieved parents could seek relief for discrimination in
education by bringing equal protection claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 or under § 504 of the
Handicapped Rehabilitation Act of 1973. These two cases together raised, but did not
adequately answer, important issues of procedure which go to the very heart of determining
whether a child is indeed receiving a free and appropriate education.
The Supreme Court in Rowley made it clear that the importance of procedural safeguards
provided in the EAHCA "cannot be gainsaid." 458 U.S. at 205. The procedural provisions of
the Act were, as pointed out in Rowley, stressed by Congress: "Adequate compliance with
the procedures [will] in most cases assure much if not all of what Congress wished in the
way of substantive content in an individualized education program." Id. at 206.
It is the procedural requirements demanded by the EAHCA, therefore, that provide the
first line of protection to the students and their parents. In fact, the Supreme Court requires
a two-part test in cases arising under the EAHCA: "First, has the State complied with the
procedures set forth in the Act? And second, is the individualized educational program
developed through the Act's procedures reasonably calculated to enable the child to receive
educational benefit'"? Id. at 206-07.
The Supreme Court further stressed the importance of faithful compliance with the
procedural mechanism of the EAHCA in Smith. In Smith, the Court stated that the
procedures "effect Congress' intent that each child's individual educational needs be worked
out through a process that.., includes ... detailed procedural safeguards." 468 U.S. at 1011.
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tions in the Act, are the questions of burden of proof and the standard of
review in court and in administrative proceedings under the Act.
Section 1415(e)(2) of the Act states in part, "In any action brought
under this paragraph, the court shall receive the records of the adminis-
trative proceedings, shall hear additional evidence at the request of a
party, and, basing its decision on a preponderance of the evidence, shall
grant such relief as the court determines is appropriate." s
Although the statute is explicit that the standard of proof is to be by a
preponderance of the evidence, there is no specific indication as to which
party shall bear the burdens of production and of persuasion. In the
absence of this specificity, courts have reached different interpretations. 9
Further, although the Act clearly envisions judicial review, the scope of
that review is unclear, and courts have reached different interpretations
of that scope. Indeed, despite the Act's intermingling of the standard of
proof with the provision for judicial review, at least implying a complete
de novo review by the court, the United States Supreme Court in
Hendrick Hudson District Board of Education v. Rowley' ° gave some
indication that section 1415(e)(2) might not be read as allowing the
district court complete de novo powers of review when it held:
[T]he provision that a reviewing court base its decision on the
"preponderance of the evidence" is by no means an invitation to
the courts to substitute their own notions of sound educational
policy for those of school authorities which they review. The very
importance which Congress has attached to compliance with
certain procedures in the preparation of an IEP would be frus-
trated if a court were simply to set decisions at nought. The fact
that § 1415(e) requires the reviewing court "receive the records of
the [state] (sic) administrative proceedings" carries with it the
implied requirement that due weight shall be given to these
proceedings."
Clearly the Court contemplated that the administrative determination
should be accorded some significant role in the judicial decision. Just
what that role is remains unclear. There is the obvious question of what
is due weight. There is also confusion in the Court's language as to
whether it requires due weight be given to the LEA, the due process
hearing officers, or the SEA.
On the one hand, the Court said, "[Tihe provision that a reviewing
court base its decision on the 'preponderance of the evidence' is by no
" 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(2) (1982).
9 See infra notes 33-63 and accompanying text.
10 458 U.S. 176 (1982).
11 Id. at 206 (emphasis added). See also infra notes 73-78 and accompanying text.
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means an invitation to the courts to substitute their own notions of
sound educational policy for those of school authorities which they
review .... -"12 This language implies that due weight is to be given the
LEA. On the other hand, the Supreme Court's statement "that Section
1415(e) requires the reviewing court 'receive the records of the [state]
(sic) administrative proceedings' carries with it the implied requirement
that due weight shall be given to these proceedings"'13 and implies that
the due weight should be given the due process hearing officers' decisions.
II. THE ACT
The key provision of the EAHCA is the requirement that each
handicapped child be provided a free and appropriate public education.' 4
To ensure implementation of this mandate, Congress required state and
local school authorities to establish systems which would first identify
those children in need of special education.15 Congress then provided
extensive procedural protections to ensure that the school authorities
provide those identified children with a FAPE.16
The extensive procedural protections included parental consent or
involvement in many decisions affecting the child's educational
program.17 Congress also required multidisciplinary and nondiscrimina-
tory testing.' In what is perhaps the most far-reaching requirement,
Congress required the LEA to develop, at least annually, an Individual-
ized Education Program (hereinafter IEP) for each handicapped child.19
The IEP is to state the child's present level of educational functioning and
to articulate both long and short term educational goals and objectives.20
To ensure that the parents had sufficient information available to
participate in the educational decisionmaking, Congress provided the
parents with the right to have an Independent Educational Evaluation
(IEE) at public expense. 21 The IEE, like the school system's evaluation, is
to be multidisciplinary. 22
On the substantive level of what constitutes a FAPE, Congress
provided very little guidance, though it did indicate that placements
12 458 U.S. at 206.
13 Id.
14 See supra note 2.
15 20 U.S.C. § 1412(2)(C) (1982).
16 Id. §§ 1412(5)(B)-(C), 1415.
17 Id. §§ 1414(a)(1)(c)(iii), 1415(b)(1).
18 Id. § 1412(5)(C); 34 C.F.R. § 300.532 (1986).
19 20 U.S.C. §§ 1412(4), 1414(a)(5) (1982); 34 C.F.R. § 300.343(d) (1986).
20 20 U.S.C. § 1401(19) (1982); 34 C.F.R. § 300.346 (1986).
21 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(1)(A) (1982); 34 C.F.R. § 300.503 (1986).
22 34 C.F.R. § 300.503(e) (1986).
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should be in the least restrictive environment. 23 Congress was, however,
very explicit when it came to the procedural protections to which the
parents and the child were entitled.
The EAHCA and its supporting regulations identify clear procedural
steps to be followed in the process that moves from identification of a child
in need of special education to provision of a FAPE. First, the child must
be identified. 24 Then the child is evaluated by the multidisciplinary
team. 25 Following evaluation, a meeting is convened to determine the
child's eligibility for special education. 26 After an eligibility determina-
tion, an IEP is developed with parental participation.27 Following devel-
opment of an IEP, a placement decision is made, based on the goals and
objectives contained in the IEP.28 As stated before, the IEP must then be
reviewed at least annually. In addition, the child must be re-evaluated at
least every three years.29
If at any point in this process there is a disagreement between parents
and the LEA, a due process hearing may be requested. 30 Following this
administrative hearing, the state may provide a state-level review.3 '
Following this administrative process, suit may be filed in either state or
federal court. 32
III. BURDEN OF PROOF UNDER THE ACT
Burden of proof refers to two distinct questions: who has the burden of
producing evidence on a particular issue and who has the burden of
persuasion on a particular issue? Failure to produce evidence will result
in a finding against the party bearing that burden. Once evidence is
produced, however, there remains the separate question of whether the
evidence persuades the fact finder under one of the applicable standards
of proof, preponderance of the evidence, clear and convincing, or beyond
a reasonable doubt33 In determining which party has the burden of
persuasion, one must take into account such things as who pled the fact,
what is judicially convenient, what is fair, and what special policy con-
23 20 U.S.C. §§ 1412(5)(B), 1414(a)(1)(C)(iv) (1982); 34 C.F.R. § 300.550-.554 (1986).
24 20 U.S.C. § 1414(a)(1)(A) (1982); 34 C.F.R. § 300.220 (1986).
25 20 U.S.C. § 1412(5)(C) (1982); 34 C.F.R. § 300.531 (1986).
26 34 C.F.R. § 300.345 (1986).
27 20 U.S.C. § 1401(19) (1982); 34 C.F.R. § 300.345 (1986).
28 34 C.F.R. § 300.552(a)(2) (1986), .342(b)(1); see also 34 C.F.R. § 300, app. C, question
42 at 84 (1986).
29 20 U.S.C. § 1412(5)(c) (1982); 34 C.F.R. § 300.534(b) (1986).
30 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(2) (1982).
31 Id. § 1415(c).
32 Id. § 1415(e)(1).
" C. MCCOMCK, ON EVIDENCE 947 (E. Cleary 3d ed. 1984).
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siderations might come into play.34 The primary concern of this Article is
the allocation of the burden of persuasion, though it will become apparent
that allocating the burden of production may aid in determining who
should have the burden of persuasion.
A. Burden of Persuasion on Substantive Issues
The Act requires that disputes be heard by the local due process
hearing officer.35 The Act, however, is unclear as to which party is to
carry the burden of persuasion. Courts, hearing officers, and state review
officers are split, though the majority appear to place the burden of
persuasion on the party seeking to change the status quo.
For example, in Tatro v. Texas (hereinafter Tatro II),36 the Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit confirmed this allocation of the burden in
EAHCA matters. In Tatro 11, the issue was whether a child's need for
clean intermittant catheterization fell within the requirements of the
EAHCA. On the issue of burden of proof, the court held:
[W]e are convinced that the central role of the IEP in the
educational scheme contemplated by the EAHCA and in the
standard of review developed in Rowley gives rise to a presump-
tion in favor of the educational placement established by Amber's
IEP. Moreover, because the IEP is jointly developed by the school
district and the parents, fairness requires that the party attack-
ing its terms should bear the burden of showing why the educa-
tional setting established by the IEP is not appropriate.37
In Doe v. Brookline School Committee,38 the SEA determined that the
LEA's IEP was inadequate and inappropriate. Although confronted with
the issue of whether the LEA would have to continue funding of the
disputed placement, the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit clearly
stated who should have the burden of proof:
We hold that in view of the congressional preference for mainte-
nance of the current educational placement, a party that seeks to
modify an existing educational placement, program or services
must proceed by a motion for preliminary injunction. As with
34 Id. at 952.
" Although 20 U.S.C. § 1415 (e)(2) (1982) indicates that the court will use a preponder-
ance of the evidence standard, the Act and supporting regulations are silent on the standard
to be used by the hearing officer. See Id. § 1415(b)(2); 34 C.F.R. § 300.506-.509.
36 703 F.2d 823 (5th Cir. 1983).
37 Id. at 830.
8 722 F.2d 910 (1st Cir. 1983).
[Vol. 36:67
6https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol36/iss1/11
HANDICAPPED CHILDREN ACT
issues of funding interim placement,... the party seeking
modification of the status quo should bear the burden of proof.3 9
The most articulate opinion for determining who has the burden was
written in Burger v. Murray County School District.40 In that case, the
district court was directly confronted with the issue of who had the
burden of proof to establish the appropriateness of the LEA's decision to
remove a child from a residential placement and transfer him into a
self-contained learning disabilities class. Citing Tatro II,41 the court held
that "when the suggestion is made that a child, who falls under the aegis
of the EAHCA and is currently learning in what has been deemed to be
an appropriate setting, be moved to a different facility, the party
advocating the move should bear the burden of proving its propriety. ' 42
Courts have also placed the burden of persuasion on the LEA when it
is the parents who are seeking to change the status quo. In Davis v.
District of Columbia Board of Education,43 the parents filed for the due
process hearing, alleging that the LEA had failed to provide a placement
for their child. The district court, without stating reasons, held that the
LEA had failed to meet its burden of proof.44
Other courts have used broad language in allocating the burden of
proof while holding that parents have the burden. In Bales v. Clarke,45
the parents were advocating a change in the child's placement. The
parents were also seeking reimbursement for expenses of a summer
program in which they had unilaterally placed their child. The court used
broad language in imposing the burden on the parents, but did not
s9 Id. at 919; see also S-1 v. Turlington, 635 F.2d 342, 348-49 (5th Cir. 1981)"In light of
the remedial purposes of these statutes [EAHCA and § 504], we find that the burden is on
the local and state defendants.... Our conclusion is butressed by the fact that in most cases,
the handicapped students and their parents lack the wherewithal to know or assert their
rights under either the EHA or section 504."); Lang v. Braintree School Comm., 545 F.
Supp. 1221 (D. Mass. 1982)(the burden of proof on the LEA in attempt to change from
private to public school); Davis v. District of Columbia Bd. of Educ., 530 F. Supp. 1209
(D.D.C. 1982)(burden of proof on LEA).
40 612 F. Supp. 434 (N.D. Ga. 1984).
41 id. at 437.
42 Id. The Third Circuit also places the burden of proof on the LEA. In Grymes v.
Madden, 672 F.2d 321 (3d Cir. 1982), the court upheld the district court award of a full
tuition grant because the LEA had "failed to sustain its burden of proof that an appropriate
public program existed." Id. at 322; see also Silvio v. Commonwealth, 1981-1982 EHLR DEC.
533:577 (Pa. Commonw. Ct. 1982)(burden of proof on the LEA).
4' 530 F. Supp. 1209 (D.D.C. 1982).
" Id. at 1211-12; see also Lang v. Braintree School Comm., 545 F. Supp. 1221, 1228 (D.
Mass. 1982). At least one jurisdiction has promulgated a state regulation placing the burden
of proof on the LEA. See Grymes v. Madden, 672 F.2d 321, 322 (3d Cir. 1982).
"' 523 F. Supp. 1366 (E.D. Va. 1981)(Warriner, J.). See also Cothern v. Mallory, 565 F.
Supp. 701, 705-08 (W.D. Mo. 1983).
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explain why the burden was placed upon the parents.46 In light of the
factual setting, therefore, it is hard to say whether Bales stands for the
proposition that the parents must always bear the burden, or whether it
stands for the application of the status quo rule.
Placing the burden of proof on the party seeking to change the status
quo is consistent with the underlying theory of allocation of all burdens
of proof. McCormick points out that "[t]he burdens of pleading and proof
with regard to most facts have been and should be assigned to the
plaintiff who generally seeks to change the present state of affairs and
who therefore naturally should be expected to bear the risk of failure of
proof or persuasion.'47
Such an allocation on issues of substance makes good sense. Given
protections within the Act, most importantly the requirement that the
LEA provide an IEE,4 8 and the right of parents to have access to a child's
educational records,49 there seems little reason for parents or the school
system to need special protection or help in establishing substantive
allegations concerning the child.
B. Burden of Proof on Procedural Issues
While traditional doctrine may work well on substantive issues, there
is a strong argument that the LEA should bear more responsibility for
the burden of persuasion on procedural issues regardless of which party
is seeking to change the status quo. As stated by the United States
Supreme Court, "Congress placed every bit as much emphasis upon
compliance with procedures giving parents and guardians a large mea-
sure of participation at every stage of the administrative process."50
4' For a severe criticism of Bales, see Burger v. Murray County School Dist., 612 F. Supp.
434 (N.D. Ga. 1984). See also text accompanying note 40.
Courts have also placed the burden of persuasion on the party challenging the previous
administrative determination in what is apparently a confusion of the difference between
standard of review and burden of proof. E.g. McKenzie v. Jefferson, 566 F. Supp. 404, 406
(D.D.C. 1983); Cohen v. School Bd., 450 So. 2d 1238, 1241 (Fla. App. 1984); see generally
infra text and accompanying note 105.
The court in Town of Burlington v. Department of Education, 736 F.2d 773, 794 (1st Cir.
1985), affd on other grounds, 471 U.S. 359 (1986), placed the burden on the parents
"because it structurally assists courts in according the administrative agency's expertise
the respect it is owed, an approach Rowley implicitly encourages." See also Tracey T. v.
McDaniel, 610 F. Supp. 947 (N.D. Ga. 1985). Rather than meeting the requirement in
Rowley to give "due weight" to the administrative proceedings, see infra notes 107-25 and
accompanying text, this minority position gives deference to an opposing party in a law suit.
Such deference would make judicial review meaningless. See generally infra notes 107-08
and accompanying text.
7 McCoRbCK, supra note 33, at 949.
4 See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
49 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(1)(A) (1982).
50 Board of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 205 (1982)(emphasis added).
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Procedural violations as a result have assumed increased importance in
disputes between the LEA and the parents. 51
As stated by the Supreme Court in Rowley in its discussion of judicial
inquiry into cases brought under the Act, the first consideration is
whether or not "the state complied with the procedures set forth in the
Act.52 The Court added that such inquiry will require a court not only "to
satisfy itself that the state has adopted the state plan, policies and
assurances required by the Act, but also to determine that the state has
created an IEP which conforms with the requirements of Section
401(19)."53 Therefore, Rowley imposes an affirmative requirement that
inquiry be made into procedural compliance.
Since it is the LEA's responsibility to ensure the procedural rights of
the parents,5 4 it is arguably the LEA which must carry this burden.
Allocating the burden of proof to the LEA to show compliance with
procedural requirements is consistent with the underlying purpose of the
EAHCA which was remedial in nature.55
In S-1 v. Turlington56 , a handicapped student was expelled. The LEA
claimed that the parents had waived their right to establish that the LEA
had failed to show the absence of a causal connection between the
handicap and the student's misconduct. The court held, however, that
there was no waiver, because it was the duty of the school system to show
that there was no causal connection between the handicap and the
expulsion. The court stated that "[tihe issue is therefore squarely
presented whether the burden of raising the question whether a student's
misconduct is a manifestation of the student's handicap is on the state
and local officials or the student. '57 In other words, the burden was on the
school to establish that it had followed the correct decision-making
process and did not expel the child for a manifestation of his handicap.
The court in Turlington went on to state:
"' See, e.g., Jackson v. Franklin County School Bd., 806 F.2d 623 (5th Cir. 1986)
(procedural violations sufficient to support finding that LEA has failed to provide FAPE);
Hall v. Vance, 774 F.2d 629, 635 (4th Cir. 1985)(procedural violations sufficient to support
finding that LEA has failed to provide FAPE).
52 458 U.S. at 206.
Id. at 206-07 n.27.
4 20 U.S.C. § 1415(a) (1982).
5 See Clune & VanPelt, A Political Method of Evaluating the Education for All
Handicapped Children Act of 1975 and Several Gaps of Gap Analysis, 48 LAW & CoNmMP.
Psoss. 7, 12-20 (1985); see also Neal & Kirp, The Allure of Legalization Reconsidered: The
Case of Special Education, 48 LAW & CoNIESp. PRoBs. 63, 67-72 (1985). See generally S-1 v.
Turlington, 635 F.2d 342, 348-49 (5th Cir. 1981)("In light of the remedial purposes of these
statutes ... ").
56 635 F.2d 342 (5th Cir. 1981).
57 Id. at 348-49.
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[I]n light of the remedial purposes of these statutes we find that
the burden is on the local and state defendants to make this
determination. Our conclusion is buttressed by the fact that in
most cases, the handicapped students and their parents lack the
wherewithal to know or assert their rights under either EHA or
section 504."58
Since the procedural rights of the Act were designed to remedy a problem,
it is logical that the agency seeking a remedy show that it has indeed
complied.
As a further reason for allocating the burden of proof for procedural
violations to the LEA, it should be kept in mind that the aids available to
the parent on the substantive issues, such as an IEE and access to
documents, are of more limited use when it comes to procedural viola-
tions. Formal discovery procedures are not available at the administra-
tive level, and evidence of procedural violations may not be in the
student's educational records.59
When there are allegations of procedural violations, the better policy
would be to place at least some portion of the burden upon the LEA. Two
methods come to mind. First, the LEA could be allocated the burden of
production on the issue of procedural compliance. Failure to produce
evidence sufficient to meet the burden of production 60 would result in a
decision against the LEA. Upon production of sufficient evidence, the
burden of persuasion would remain with the parents. This approach has
the advantage of addressing the concern that the evidence is peculiarly
within the control of one party. This approach, however, does not
adequately meet the underlying concern that the Act by its very nature
is remedial and that the policy establishing it argues strongly that the
LEA also should have the burden of persuasion.
A second approach would be to adopt a policy of allocation analogous to
that used by some courts in actions arising under the the Civil Rights Act
of 1964.61 In essence what would be required is the opposite of the first
approach. The parents would have the burden of producing evidence
sufficient for the hearing officer or court to find reasonable grounds to
believe that a procedural violation exists, and then the burden of
production shifts to the LEA. This would be perhaps analogous to the
58 Id.
11 For example, it is conceivable that the school system, in violation of the Act, has
decided that it will not place children in residential programs. See Abrahamson v.
Hershman, 701 F.2d 223, 227 (1st Cir. 1983). Evidence of this policy decision is most likely
to exist in records other than the child's educational file.
"e The standard by which it is determined whether there has been a sufficient
production of evidence has been described as "such that a reasonable man could draw from
it the inference of the existence of the particular fact to be proved." C. McCoPhuCK, supra
note 33, at 953.
6' 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e) (1982).
[Vol. 36:67
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requirement that once the plaintiff under Title VIII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 establishes a prime facie case, the burden of production shifts
to the defendant. 62 This approach would both conform to the recognition
that evidence of procedural propriety is usually within the control of the
LEA, while giving effect to the remedial nature of the Act.
Under this second approach, the evidence sufficient to meet the
parents' burden of production should be minimal, given difficulties of
proof and the importance of the issue. The standard should be no more
than an allegation of a specific violation of a procedural right provided by
the Act or its supporting regulations along with information sufficient to
allow a reasonable person to infer the existence of that procedural
violation.63
IV. THE NATURE OF JUDICIAL DEFERENCE TO ADMINISTRATIVE
DETERMINATIONS UNDER THE ACT
A. Traditional Administrative Review
In exploring questions of what weight should be given to the adminis-
trative determination and at what level of the administrative process
that weight should be given under the EAHCA, it is first necessary to
understand traditional judicial review of administrative determinations.
In traditional administrative settings, the judicial scope of review is
controlled by at least three concerns.
The first two concerns are related to the purpose in setting up the
agency procedure. First, the scope of the judicial review is limited by
the belief that deference should be given to agency experts. 64 Second,
the scope of review is limited by the belief that courts should defer to the
agency because expediency will otherwise be lost. Without limited review
the administrative proceeding becomes merely an added layer causing
delay rather than expediting matters.6 5 The third concern limiting
review is common to all appeals; that is, a degree of deference should be
given to the fact finder who has heard the evidence first hand.66
These three concerns have led to what might be called a typical or
traditional standard of the appropriate review of administrative deter-
minations. This traditional approach leans heavily on the belief that a
court should show significant deference to the agency. Specifically, the
62 Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 256-58 (1981). See also
42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3631 (1982)(Title VIII); Robinson v. 12 Lofts Realty, Inc., 610 F.2d 1032
(2d Cir. 1979).
63 See supra note 60.
64 B. SCHWARTZ, ADMIITRATIVE LAW 585 (2d ed. 1984).
66 Id.
66 See R. PIERCE, S. SHAPIRO & P. VERKUmh, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROWF.S 358 (1985)
[hereinafter PxzcE].
19881
11Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1988
CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW
predominant standard of review since 191267 is that the court should
determine whether the agency decision is supported by "substantial
evidence." Substantial evidence represents a narrow standard of review,
permitting administrators greater discretion in fact-finding than that
accorded to trial judges under the "clearly erroneous" standard.68
The evidence to be considered in determining whether substantial
evidence exists includes not just evidence favorable to the agency
decision, but also evidence opposing the agency decision.69 Further, the
agency decision to which there will be deference is the final or review
decision. For example, in a National Labor Relations Board determina-
tion, when a hearing officer reinstates an employee, but the full board
reverses the hearing officer, any deference the court owes is to the full
board. 70
B. What Is Due Weight and to Which Issues Does It Apply?
The Supreme Court has made it clear that the EAHCA requires the
court to conduct a de novo review of the state administrative decision.7 1
As pointed out, however, the Court also stated that the Act "carries with
it the implied requirement that due weight shall be given these
proceedings. "72
The immediate question is whether this requirement of due weight is
the same as the deference a court traditionally gives an administrative
determination. At least one circuit has come very close to holding that it
67 SCHWARTZ, supra note 64, at 597.
What is substantial evidence is a more difficult question. Id. It has been pointed out,
however, that "it has been generally accepted that 'substantial evidence' represents a
narrower standard of review, permitting administrators greater discretion in fact-finding
than accorded to trial judges under the 'clearly erroneous' standard." S. BREYERS & R. STEwART,
ADMNSTRATIVE LAW AND REGULATORY POLICY 185 (1979). The substantial evidence test applies to
formal adjudication and rule-making. Informal adjudication is tested by an arbitrary and
capricious standard. Id. at 195-96; PIERCE, supra note 66, at 360.
The quantum of evidence necessary has been variously described. It has been described as
equivalent to the standard used in determining directed verdicts. S. BREYER & R. STEWART,
supra, at 185. In Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841, 851 (D.C. Cir. 1970),
Judge Leventhal stated that the court must determine whether the agency has "taken a
'hard look' at the salient problems, and has not genuinely engaged in reasoned decision-
making."
68 See infra notes 125-46 and accompanying text.
69 See infra notes 97-102 and accompanying text.
70 PIERCE, supra note 66, at 358.
Traditional judicial review of agency findings functions like appellate review of a court
decision on the issue of what can be considered. The general rule is that the court is limited
to the agency record. The court cannot expand or delete the evidence submitted during the
agency proceedings. B. Scmvsn, supra note 64, at 587.
71 Hendrick Hudson Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 205 (1982); School Bd.
of the County of Prince William v. Malone, 762 F.2d 1210 (4th Cir. 1985).
72 Rowley, 458 U.S. at 206.
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does. In Karl v. Board of Education,73 the parents disagreed with a
placement decision and requested a due process hearing. The parents
wanted their mentally retarded daughter to be placed in a commercial
food preparation program, and the school proposed to place her in a
work/study program. The local due process hearing officer determined
that the student should be placed in the food preparation program with a
student-adult ratio of nine to one. The school system appealed the
decision to the New York State Commissioner of Education, who upheld
the placement decision, but reversed the student-adult ratio requirement.
The parents then filed suit in the district court. The district court held
that it agreed with the decision of the local hearing officer on the
student-adult ratio and indicated that the court's obligation to defer to
the judgment of the state educational authorities was diminished by the
failure of the hearing officer and the Commissioner to agree. The Second
Circuit reversed:
[W]e disagree with Judge Telesca's view that the federal courts
need not defer to state educational authorities whenever there is
some disagreement among state officers in the course of state
proceedings. We believe Rowley requires that federal courts defer
to the final decision of the state authorities, and that deference
may not be eschewed merely because a decision is not unanimous
or the reviewing authority disagrees with the hearing officer.
There is no principle of administrative law, which, in the event of
a disagreement between a hearing officer and reviewing agency
over demeanor evidence, obviates the need for deference to an
agency's final decision where such deference is otherwise
appropriate.7 4
The court's opinion evidences the strong influence of the traditional
judicial approach to agency determinations. For example, the court's
emphasis on deference to the final administrative determination is the
classic view of administrative review.7 5 Indeed, the word deference in
itself is interesting, since the Supreme Court in Rowley used the words
73 736 F.2d 873 (2d Cir. 1984).
It at least ought to be clear that the standard of review is something more than an abuse
of discretion standard. In Roncker v. Walter, 700 F.2d 1058 (6th Cir. 1983), the court
reversed a district court decision which applied an abuse of discretion standard to the LEA's
placement decision.
74 Karl, 736 F.2d. at 877. See also Quackenbush v. Johnson City School Dist., 716 F.2d
141 (2d Cir. 1983), in which the Second Circuit, in what is clearly a misinterpretation of
Rowley, stated that in Rowley, "the Supreme Court rejected a standard of de novo review."
Id. at 146. If that were the case, there would be little function for judicial review and there
would be direct contradiction to the provision that the court base its decision on a
preponderance of the evidence.
75 See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
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"due weight," not deference. 76 Further, Rowley, contrary to the decision
in Karl, does not even specifically state that due weight is to be given to
the final administrative determination. Rather the Court left it ambigu-
ous as to the party to whom due weight was to be given, indicating only
that due weight was to be given to "administrative proceedings. '77 Be
that as it may, Karl does provide strong support for the argument that the
reviewing court is to apply a substantial evidence standard. 78
There was a strong dissent by Judge Pratt in Karl:
The majority characterizes this process as 'deferential substan-
tive review.' However characterized, 'deference' or 'due weight' to
the administrative proceedings does not mean simple subservi-
ence to the last administrator to speak, particularly when, as
here, the combined expertise within the administrative system
produced three different IEPs. Rowley's 'gloss' on a clearly writ-
ten statute requires only that the district judge give 'due weight'
to the views of the administrators; when those views conflict, it
does not require him to accept the conclusion of the state's
commissioner of education, nor does it relieve him of the burden
of making the de novo determination required by congress. In
ratifying the commissioner's decision, the majority has, in effect,
adopted the substantial evidence standard of review that con-
gress carefully rejected. Indeed, by semantically shifting Rowley's
substantively oriented 'reasonably calculated' standard to a pro-
cedural inquiry of whether the determination was a 'reasoned
calculation,' the majority has effectively eliminated the substan-
tive step of the Rowley analysis. 79
Decisions made by hearing officers and judges can be placed in four
different categories: purely historical fact decisions (for example, the
child's age or disability); strictly policy questions (for example, will a
developmental approach versus a behavioral approach be adopted to
educate a childso or which of two competing methods to teach deaf
" Rowley, 458 U.S. at 206.
77 Id.
7' There is support for the proposition that the Supreme Court did not intend to
distinguish between state level review decisions and local hearing decisions. See infra notes
108-13 and accompanying text.
79 Karl v. Bd. of Educ., 736 F.2d 873, 878-79 (2d Cir. 1984). The court went on to state:
"[H]e [the judge] properly faced up to the hopeless conflict among the administrators over
Lisa's needs and carried out his statutory responsibility by making a de novo determination
of her appropriate IEP." Id. at 879.
'0 See Abrahamson v. Hershman, 701 F.2d 223 (1st Cir. 1983):
Thus it might be inappropriate for a district court under the rubric of statutory
construction to impose a particular methodology upon a state. Nevertheless, for
judicial review to have any meaning, beyond mere review of state procedures, the
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children to speak is better?);81 factual questions concerning the appropri-
ateness of a program for a particular child (for example, does this child
require a residential program versus a day program?);8 2 and legal
questions concerning the interpretation of the statute (for example,
whether the statute contemplates providing a particular service as part of
the educational requirements imposed on the LEA). 83
It is arguable that there should be a different level of review for each,
and Karl could possibly be limited in its application on the grounds that
what was at issue was more a question of educational policy than a
factual determination of, for example, whether a given program was
appropriate. Parents and administrators agreed in Karl on a commercial
food preparation program, but disagreed over the educational policy issue
of what was appropriate staffing.84
Limiting due weight to matters of policy in this manner is consistent
with opinions in the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit. Doe v. Anrig,85
perhaps the most thoughtful case to date addressing the issue of judicial
deference, involved a Down's Syndrome child who had been in residential
settings his entire life. In February, 1975, the LEA proposed placing the
child in a non-residential school setting. The parents rejected the IEP, but
entered into an agreement whereby they paid for a residential component
and the school paid for placement in a day school.
In 1977, on reevaluation, a new IEP proposed placing the child in a
different non-residential school and provided for him to live at home with
his parents. The parents rejected the IEP and sought administrative
review. The Massachusetts Bureau of Special Education Appeals held
that the proposed placement was appropriate but that there should be a
one-year transition program. This decision was affirmed by the Depart-
ment of Education's State Advisory Council for Special Education. The
parents sought judicial review.
The district court found that the parents had shown by a preponderance
of the evidence that the residential program was the appropriate place-
ment. Both parties appealed the district court decision. The LEA argued
that the district court failed to "grant substantial deference to the
decisions of the state administrative bodies .... "86 The parents appealed
on the issue of reimbursement.
courts must be free to construe the term "educational" so as to insure, at least,
that the state IEP provides the hope of educational benefit.
81 See generally Rowley, 458 U.S. at 207 n.29.
82 E.g., Abrahamson v. Hershman, 701 F.2d 223 (1st Cir. 1983).
" See Irving Indep. School Dist. v. Tatro, 468 U.S. 883 (1984)(discussion of related
services required under the Act); infra note 113 and accompanying text.
84 736 F.2d at 874.
"5 692 F.2d 800 (1st Cir. 1982)(argument before the First Circuit came prior to Rowley,
while its opinion came after Rowley).
86 Id. at 804.
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Addressing the LEA's contention, the First Circuit held:
We disagree with [the LEA] insofar as they would limit the
district court to the kind of judicial review of agency action
contemplated under the Administrative Procedure Act. The stat-
ute unambiguously provides that a reviewing court may take
cognizance of evidence not before the state educational agency
and must base its decision on the preponderance of the evidence
before it. As such, the review mechanism which the Act creates
stands in sharp contrast to the usual situation where a court is
confined to examining the record made before the agency [citation
omitted] and to determining whether the administrative decision
is supported by substantial evidence.87
The court then went on to indicate that "due weight" was directed
toward policy considerations:
[W]e find nothing in the record before us to suggest that "due
weight" was not accorded. In addition, the Supreme Court's
concern was with courts "substitut[ing] their own notions of
educational policy for those of the school authorities." [citations
omitted] The difference here between Judge Zobel and the school
authorities was not a choice of educational policy, but resolution
of an individualized factual issue as to the effect of John's
handicap on his ability to benefit from the proposed school
setting.88
Then, as if to stress the point further, a footnote added:
No contention was or is made here that the residential placement
approved by the court was an option which the state would
disapprove on general policy grounds. 89
7 Id. at 805 (citing Town of Burlington v. Department of Educ., 655 F.2d 428, 431 (1st
Cir. 1981)).
The court also rejected the contention that review was limited to whether the state had
complied with procedures. This argument had been made in Rowley, the court pointed out,
and was rejected:
We find petitioners' contention unpersuasive, for Congress expressly rejected
provisions that would have so severely restricted the role of reviewing courts. In
substituting the current language of the statute for language that would have
made state administrative findings conclusive if supported by substantial evi-
dence, the Conference Committee explained that courts were to make 'indepen-
dent decision[s] based on a preponderance of the evidence.' S. CoNF. REP. No. 455,
supra, at 50, reprinted in [1975] U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMiN. Nsws, 1425, 1503. See
also 121 CONG. REc. 37416 (1975)(remarks of Sen. Williams).
Id. at 805 (citing Rowley, 458 U.S. at 205).
" 692 F.2d at 806.
89 Id. at 806 n.12.
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In Abrahamson v. Hershman,90 the First Circuit again considered
whether a child required a residential placement in order to receive a
FAPE. The public school presented the parents with an IEP calling for a
day program and the parents appealed to the Massachusetts Bureau of
Special Education Appeals (BSEA). The BSEA hearing officer found that
the student's residential needs were not educationally related and
therefore not the responsibility of the school system. The parents then
appealed this decision to the State Advisory Commission, which reaf-
firmed the hearing officer's decision. The parents then filed suit in federal
district court.
The district court held that the child's residential needs were educa-
tionally related. On appeal, the school system argued that the district
court had failed to give due weight to the BSEA. The Circuit Court
disagreed:
To be sure, the district court did not reach the same result as
did the BSEA. But, as the Supreme Court noted in Rowley, while
courts must give "due weight" to state administrative agencies
and "be careful to avoid imposing their view of preferable
educational models upon the States," [citation omitted] courts
ultimately must make "independent decision[s] based on a pre-
ponderance of the evidence.
The court did not disagree with the state over educational
policy, merely over whether the state-licensed program ... would
serve Daniel's own particular needs. Such an issue fell clearly
within the scope of the question that Rowley left to the courts.91
Limiting the strong deference articulated in Karl to educational policy
determinations makes good sense in light of the theory underlying
judicial deference to administrative determinations. The history of SEAs
and LEAs and the remedial nature of the legislation,92 along with the fact
that the administrative agencies to be remedied are in control of the
administrative procedures 93 makes broad deference such as suggested in
Karl questionable.
Congress left it to the states to set up the administrative procedures. 9
4
Indeed, the regulations state that it is the LEA and the SEA that appoint
the respective hearing and review officers. 95 That is a little like Congress
dealing with mine safety not by creating OSHA but by telling mine
owners to shape up and set up their own watchdog agency to make sure
90 701 F.2d 223 (1st Cir. 1983).
9' Id. at 230.
92 See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
93 20 U.S.C. § 1412(5) (1982) requires the state to establish procedural safeguards.
94 Id.
95 34 C.F.R. § 300.506(b) (1986).
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they do it. To give deference on factual issues of the type Karl implies
would make judicial review meaningless.96
Having chosen to attach due weight to the appropriate issues, however,
the question remains: what is due weight? Is Karl correct at least with
regard to educational policy questions-that the standard should be
substantial evidence?
Although dealing with the interpretation of specific language autho-
rizing review of NLRB orders under the Taft-Hartley Act, the series of
opinions in NLRB v. Universal Camera Corp.97 provides useful guidance
in determining what due weight may mean. In Universal Camera, it was
alleged that an employee had been discharged as a result of his testimony
at an NLRB hearing. If proven, such a discharge was an unfair labor
practice under the National Labor Relations Act.98 An NLRB examiner
made a determination that the discharge was not in violation of the
NLRA. The Board, however, reversed the examiner. The Second Circuit
addressed the issue of the standard of review, holding that a recent
amendment to Taft-Hartley, the Wagner Act, did not change the standard
of review. The Board's decision was to be upheld if there was "substantial
evidence" in the record. The court then affied the Board's decision.99
The Supreme Court, reviewing the Second Circuit opinion, vacated and
remanded, holding that the Second Circuit had failed to consider the
examiner's decision in its review of the Board's action.10 0 On remand,
considering the hearing examiner's findings, the Second Circuit held that
the Board was not justified in reversing the hearing examiner. 10 1
The Supreme Court agreed with the Second Circuit that the standard
was the same after the law's amendment, but clearly disagreed that the
reviewing court was to look merely to the Board's determination to see if
that determination had shibstantial support. The Court looked to the
legislative history of the amendment and Congress' concern in the past
for the fairness of determinations by the agency:
Congress has merely made it clear that a reviewing court is not
barred from setting aside a Board decision when it cannot
conscientiously find that the evidence supporting that decision is
substantial, when viewed in the light that the record in its
96 See School Bd. of the County of Prince William, Va. v. Malone, 762 F.2d 1210, 1217
(4th Cir. 1985)('to give deference only to the decision of the School Board would render
meaningless the entire process of administrative review").
97 179 F.2d 749 (2d Cir. 1950), vacated and remanded, 340 U.S. 474, reconsidered, 190
F.2d 429 (2d Cir. 1951).
98 Universal Camera, 179 F.2d at 750.
99 Id. at 754.
Io Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474 (1951).
101 NLRB v. Universal Camera Corp., 190 F.2d 429 (2d Cir. 1951).
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entirety furnishes, including the body of evidence opposed to the
Board's view.10 2
As to the examiner's opinion, the Court stated:
It is therefore difficult to escape the conclusion that the plain
language of the statutes directs a reviewing court to determine
the substantiality of evidence on the record including the exam-
iner's report.10 3
Universal Camera makes it clear that the evidence to be considered
includes not just evidence favorable to the agency decision, but also
evidence opposing the agency decision. Perhaps the debate over "due
weight" can be reconciled in this manner, that is, perhaps due weight
means the court is to consider the administrative determination or the
LEA finding as a factor to take into account in reaching its decision. The
Court may have been expressing a concern that just as unfavorable
evidence was to be considered in Universal Camera, the court is to
consider expressly the agency determinations and whatever probative
weight they might offer.
While Universal Camera dealt with whether consideration should be
given to the entire record in applying the substantial evidence test, the
case is pertinent to the instant concern. As evidenced by Universal
Camera, there is a concern that in reviewing administrative determina-
tions the district court not ignore evidence. Universal Camera saw the
solution as requiring consideration of the entire record. Likewise, the
concern under the EAHCA is that the court affirmatively consider the
agency decisions.
As a way of providing this considered judgment, the court should give
due weight, that is, consider the whole record, including the opinions of
the hearing officers. The practical import, then, would be that the trial
court should be required to evince a consideration of the administrative
proceedings. Ideally this would include explaining why it decided not to
follow the administrative determinations. Given that such an explana-
tion could easily become a pro forma matter, however, it seems preferable
simply to require evidence the court has reviewed the administrative
record including the opinions of the administrative hearing officers.
102 340 U.s. at 488.
103 Id. at 493.
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C. To Whom/To What Should Due Weight Be Given?
1. The LEA?
If the due weight were limited to strictly educational policy questions,
such as choosing the best method for educating the deaf, as opposed to
factual questions of whether a particular child would benefit from this
rather than that method, it would be logical to provide special consider-
ation to the LEA, since it indeed has the expertise. Several problems,
however, exist with the giving of due weight to the determination of the
LEA. First, as discussed above, there is some lack of logic to giving
special consideration to the group whose actions are sought to be
remedied.' 0 4 Second, there is the basic inconsistency of section 1415
providing that the administrative proceedings are to be considered by the
judge, making specific provision for the court to hear additional testi-
mony, and making a de novo determination by a preponderance of the
evidence. 10 5 The ability to consider additional evidence requires the court
to have the concomitant freedom to give less deference to an agency
determination, since the agency will not have considered that additional
evidence.
Indeed, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in School Board of
the County of Prince William, Virginia v. Malone,0 6 after discussing the
standard of review articulated by Rowley, made it clear that any
deference in the district court's review was to be to the state administra-
tive proceedings and not to the school board. The court in Malone stated:
"To give deference only to the decision of the School Board would render
meaningless the entire process of administrative review."'10 7
2. The Local Hearing Officer or to the State Review Officer?
As noted above, the Second Circuit in Karl gave great deference to the
final state administrative determination.108 The Supreme Court's lan-
guage in Rowley, however, required that due weight should be given
to the "administrative proceedings" 10 9 while not substituting the court's
judgment of "sound educational policy for [that] of the school author-
ities . . . ."1 Interestingly, the Court stated in Rowley that a court is
required "not only to satisfy itself that the State has adopted the state
104 See generally supra note 55 and accompanying text on the remedial nature of the
legislation.
105 Preponderance is clearly a burden of persuasion question, not a standard of review
question. See generally Jaffe, Administrative Law: Burden of Proof and Scope of Review, 79
HAsv. L. REv. 914 (1966).
'06 762 F.2d 1210 (4th Cir. 1985).
107 Id. at 1217.
108 See supra text and accompanying note 75.
"o 458 U.S. at 206 (emphasis added).
110 Id.
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plan, policies and assurances required by the Act, but also to determine
that the State has created an [Individualized Education Plan] for the
child in question which conforms with the requirements of
§ 1401(19) .... ,,""I
Note here the Court's requirement that the state provide the IEP,
yet it is the LEA which has primary responsibility for developing the
IEP.112 The Court clearly equated "state" with the entire administrative
process.113
Assuming that there is special consideration of some type on non-policy
questions, when there are two administrative decisions, deference should
be given to the administrative officer who was in a position to see the
witnesses testify and to question the witnesses himself, hearing the tone
and inflection of their voices, and is consequently the best judge of their
credibility. Indeed, deference to the officer actually conducting the
hearing as opposed to the reviewing officer who merely relies on a record
is consistent with the deference given to trial judges by appellate
courts. 
114
Greater deference to the hearing officer is also supported by the fact
that under some state administrative proceedings there is no distinction
drawn between hearing officers and reviewing officers. In fact, they are
interchangeable. While the reviewing officer acts in an appellate capacity
one time, he or she will quite often act in a hearing officer capacity
another time. Whether a person is a hearing officer or a reviewing officer
... Id. at 206 n.27.
112 34 C.F.R. § 300.341 provides: "The State educational agency shall insure that each
public agency develops and implements an individualized education program for each of its
handicapped children." (emphasis added). Section 300.342 provides: "Each public agency
shall have in effect an individualized education program for every handicapped child...."
' See also Irving Indep. School Dist. v. Tatro, 468 U.S. 883, 890 n.6 (1984) where the
Court reiterated this language. Tatro also provides a clear example of the de novo review of
legal questions. In Tatro, the hearing officer determined the EAHCA required the provision
of Clean Intermittant Catheterization (CIC). The Texas Commissioner of Education adopted
the hearing officer's finding, but the State Board of Education reversed. This is strictly a
legal question-whether this was a related service, as opposed to the factual question of
whether CIC was required for the child. After repeating the language in Rowley concerning
scope of review, the court stated, "Judicial review is equally appropriate in this case, which
presents the legal question of a school's substantive obligation under the 'related services'
requirement of § 1401(17)." Legal questions are subject to greater review. Even under the
much more stringent review standards provided by traditional administrative review,
questions of law are subject to de novo review. ScHWaM, supra note 64, at 592.
114 See Jaffe, Judicial Review: Question of Fact, 69 HAv. L. REv. 1020, 1031 (1956).
Some indirect judicial support for deference to the local hearing officer can be found in
Abrahamsom v. Hershman, 701 F.2d 223, 231 (1st Cir. 1983), where after discussion of the
need to give due weight, the court assessed the local hearing officer's decision, leading to the
conclusion that the decision of the initial hearing officer was to be given due weight.
Although the review officer may not have been mentioned because it was consistent with
the local hearing officer, it is significant that the court was assessing the first decision.
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depends merely on whether the person has agreed to perform the
particular role. Each receives the same training by the same state
agencies. The reviewing officer, in other words, has no greater expertise
in the area and has less data upon which to base his decision." 16
Further, if one purpose behind limited review is that the district court
lacks the specialized knowledge and experience to review the factual
determinations in a particular area, it is clear that whatever deference is
given should be given to the local hearing officer. To the extent that the
reviewing officer has no greater expertise than the local hearing officer,
the reviewing officer's decision deserves no special consideration. 1 6 On
educational policy issues, however, special consideration should be given
to the final administrative determination, if that determination is made
by a body which has specialized expertise."17
Although not usual, it is not unheard of to have complete de novo
review without any deference or due weight being given to an adminis-
trative determination." 8 The rationale for such independent judgment is
quite varied, but includes providing a way to overcome administrative
bias. 1 9 The historical development of the EAHCA provides strong
support for the importance of overcoming such bias in special education
cases. 120
Given the clear authority to hear additional evidence and decide the
case by a preponderance of the evidence, due weight should be limited to
purely educational policy decisions and to factual questions where the
agency has brought to the proceedings an expertise or advantage not
available to the trial court. Some special consideration should be given to
the administrative expertise on educational policy where that determi-
nation is made by qualified individuals not associated with the LEA. In
115 See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. §§ 22.1-214(C) (1985), 9-6.14:14.1 (Supp. 1987); Regulations
Governing Special Education Programs For Handicapped Children and Youth In Virginia
IIC.l.k. (1985).
"' See generally Community High School Dist. 155 v. Denz, 1984-1985 EHLR DEC.
556:105 (Ill. App. Ct., 2d 1984)
117 See generally Doe v. Katherine D., 727 F.2d 809, 814 n.3 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied,
471 U.S. 1117 (1985), where the court, in upholding district court's authority to decide an
issue the administrative officer refused to decide, stated: "Nor are the necessary findings so
technical or specialized that the trial judge is less competent than the administrative
hearing officer to make them de novo."
"' Jaffe, supra note 114, at 1052-53. See also BREYER, supra note 67, at 195 n.40. Jaffe
points out in a passage that two decades later could well be applied to Karl:
It is not our point that in such situations judicial trial de novo is the necessary
answer .... If... the legislature has chosen it as the answer it ill behooves a court
to boggle at it and attempt to escape its responsibility.
Jaffe, supra note 114, at 1054.
" Jaffe, supra note 114, at 1054.
120 See supra text and accompanying note 55.
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accord with the Fourth Circuit's decision in Malone,121 special consider-
ation should not be given to the LEA. However, if the administrative
process set up by the state involves hearing officers who are experts
in educational policy, their expertise should be given serious consider-
ation.
In a jurisdiction, for example, where both the local and state level
administrative reviewing officers are lawyers without extensive training
in special education, 122 no particular deference should be given to their
determinations based solely on educational policy grounds. However, in a
jurisdiction where individuals with a particular area of expertise are
involved in the due process administrative hearings,123 greater consider-
ation should be given to the administrative determination of a preferred
educational policy. Such an approach would provide the deference to
agency experts which traditional administrative analysis favors, while
recognizing the appropriate role of the LEA in the dispute.
On factual determinations, the court should give increased consider-
ation to the hearing officers to the extent the hearing officers are in a
better position to determine factual disputes. In large measure, such
deference would be operative only on issues of credibility regarding
witnesses the trial court has not heard. To the extent the trial court has
heard a witness concerning an issue that was also part of the adminis-
trative record, the trial court is in as good a position to weigh credibility
as the hearing officer. 124
V. APPELLATE REVIEW OF JUDICIAL DETERMINATIONS
Traditional analysis would lead one to conclude that appellate court
review of the lower court's determination would be controlled by the
law-fact distinction. Trial court factual determinations are reviewable
only under a clearly erroneous standard125 whereas decisions of law are
decided de novo.126
Under traditional analysis, questions such as whether the Act requires
provision of related services, 27 whether prior to amendment the Act
12 See supra note 96.
122 See supra text and accompanying note 115.
123 E.g., MD. [Education] CODE ANN. § 8-415 (1985).
124 Such an approach would not be radical. As previously stated, as the general rule, if an
agency differs from an administrative law judge it is the agency's finding that is given
deference. However, "[a] finding by an AJ is particularly influential with a reviewing
court... when the finding is based largely on the credibility of witnesses, since the AM was
actually present at the time the testimony was given." PERCE, supra note 66, at 358.
121 See Jaffe, supra note 114.
126 Id.
127 See, e.g., text and accompanying note 113.
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contemplated an award of attorneys' fees, 128 and who under the Act has
the burden of proof are reviewed de novo by the appellate court. 129
Factual questions should, however, remain subject to the clearly
erroneous standard of review required under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 52. For example, if it has been decided that the Act requires
the LEA to provide parents with notice of procedural rights, it is a factual
conclusion whether the LEA actually gave the notice. 130
All decisions, however, do not neatly fall into the fact or law categories.
A third category is one of mixed law and fact requiring application of a
legal standard to a particular historical fact or set of facts relating to the
legal standard. Many commentators have pointed out that there is less
unanimity on the standard to be applied to legal application decisions. 131
Whether application of historical facts to a legal standard constitutes
a factual determination governed by the clearly erroneous standard, or a
legal question allowing de novo review, varies not simply from jurisdic-
tion to jurisdiction, but within jurisdictions and even within topics. An
often repeated example is in the area of negligence where the question is
application of a reasonable person standard to the facts of a particular
incident. Most courts have held that such an application is a question of
fact. 132 Other instances of fact application, however, are less uniform. 133
In the context of the Act, most courts have held that the basic issue of
whether the LEA's proposal will provide a free and appropriate education
is a factual determination. 34 For example, having determined that
128 See, e.g., Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992 (1984). The Act was recently amended to
provide for the award of attorneys' fees. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(4) (Supp. IV 1986); see, e.g., Bd.
of Educ. of the E. Windsor Regional School Dist. v. Diamond, 808 F.2d 987 (3d Cir. 1986);
Michael F. v. Cambridge School Dep't., 1986-1987 EHLR DEC. 558:269 (D. Mass. 1987).
129 See, e.g., text and accompanying note 32-62
130 See, e.g., Hall v. Vance County Public Schools, 774 F.2d 1527 (4th Cir. 1985).
131 See, e.g., Weiner, The Civil Nonjury Trial and the Law-Fact Distinction, 55 CALIF. L.
Rv. 1020, 1021-24 (1967).
132 Id. at 1024; but see Id. at 1026-31.
133 Id. at 1022-24.
124 Sre, e.g., Cain v. Yukon Public Schools, Dist. 1-27, 775 F.2d 15, 20 (10th Cir. 1985)
("we cannot find clearly erroneous the district court's determination that the response was
adequate."); Geis v. Bd. of Educ. of Parsippany-Troy Hills, Morris County, 744 F.2d 573,
584 (3d Cir. 1985)("The Board has referred us to no other evidence that would tend to
indicate that the district court's finding [that residential placement was appropriate] was
clearly erroneous or, indeed, even erroneous."); Jackson v. Franklin County School Bd., 765
F.2d 535, 539 (5th Cir. 1985)("Because the district court's findings are not clearly
erroneous .... "); McKenzie v. Smith, 771 F.2d 1527, 1535 (D.C. Cir. 1985)("although the
evidence could also support a contrary conclusion, we cannot say that the district court's
factual findings were clearly erroneous."); Colin K. v. Schmidt, 715 F.2d 1, 6 (1st Cir.
1983)("our responsibility [is] to uphold the court's findings unless they are clearly errone-
ous"); Doe v. Anrig, 692 F.2d 800, 808 (1st Cir. 1982)("The task of weighing the evidence,
however, is for the trier of fact, which here was the district court. As a reviewing court we
are limited to the question of whether the district court's finding was clearly erroneous.");
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residential educational programs are contemplated by the Act and that
the Act does not require the best educational placement, but merely one
that provides some educational benefit, it is a factual question whether a
particular child's educational needs require placement in a residential
program in order for the child to receive any educational benefit.13 5
In Abrahamson v. Hershman,136 for example, the court addressed the
issue of whether a district court's decision that a child required a
residential educational program in order to receive a FAPE should be
affirmed.
[Tihe [district] court found that educational benefits which could
only be provided through residential care were essential if Daniel
was to make any educational progress at all. Daniel's unique
condition was found to demand that he receive round-the-clock
training and reinforcement. Given the evidence before the dis-
trict court, we cannot say that this conclusion was clearly
erroneous.
137
At least one federal circuit court panel, however, has held that it will
review de novo the appropriateness of a special education placement. In
Department of Education v. Katherine D.,138 the court stated:
We apply a de novo standard of review to the questions whether
the DOE's [Department of Education] IEPs constituted a "free
appropriate public education" within the meaning of the
EAH.CA.... Because those determinations require us to weigh
the values underlying the statute in deciding the legal sufficiency
of the DOE's offers-we must, for instance, determine the weight
to be assigned the explicit congressional preference that handi-
capped children be educated in classrooms with their peers...
-we treat them as questions of law. 39
Jose P. v. Ambach, 669 F.2d 865, 871 (2d Cir. 1982)(allocation of legal responsibility was
"not clearly erroneous").
135 See generally Jaffe, supra note 114.
136 701 F.2d 223 (1st Cir. 1983); see also Adams Cent. School Dist. No. 090, Adams
County v. Deist, 214 Neb. 307, 314, 334 N.W.2d 775, 782, cert. denied, 464 U.S. 893
(1983)("We are only to determine if the hearing officer's decision is supported by the
evidence, is proper under applicable law, and if it is arbitrary or capricious.")
137 701 F.2d at 227.
'sa 727 F.2d 809 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1117 (1985).
' Id. at 814 n.2; see also Gregory K. v. Longview School Dist., 811 F.2d 1307, 1314 (9th
Cir. 1987)("We review de novo the appropriateness of a special education placement."); but
see Students of Calif. School for the Blind, 736 F.2d 538, 542 (9th Cir. 1984), vacated, 471
U.S. 148 (1985)("We will reverse the district court only if we find that it abused its
discretion in granting the preliminary injunction. Abuse of discretion is shown [only] if 'the
district court's decision was based on an error of law or on a clearly erroneous finding of
fact."'); Larry P. v. Riles, 793 F.2d 969, 978 (9th Cir. 1984)("The district court made two
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The court distinguished this conclusion from the underlying historical
factual details that led to the conclusion. Hence, although holding that
whether the IEP provided a FAPE was a legal conclusion, it stated that
it would apply the clearly erroneous standard to the district court's
factual finding concerning the staff's willingness to implement the
IEP.140
Whether a court labels factual application a question of law or a
question of fact ought to be based on a more rational approach than one
in which we look to the judge or panel of judges that happens to be
hearing the case. An attempt should be made to determine whether the
rationale underlying the law-fact distinction requires the legal applica-
tion to be treated as fact or as law. Among the considerations suggested,
"there is no reason why judges of an appellate court should defer to a trial
judge's conclusion, drawn from undisputed or established facts .... ,41 It
has also been said, "it is... important that appellate courts have a free
hand to reconcile indistinguishable cases."142 It has also been argued that
no reason of policy and no rule or statute requires that the trial
court's judgment as to the application of a rule of law to the facts
found be binding to any extent on the appellate court. The trial
judge is neither more expert in the particular field nor more
representative of the community than the appellate court .... 143
Whatever merits such arguments have as to other cases, such blanket
willingness to allow appellate courts to decide legal applications de novo
as matters of law over-simplifies the application process at least in
actions brought under the Act. For example, take a residential placement
decision. The legal application question is whether the child requires a
residential educational placement in order to receive educational benefit.
The Ninth Circuit would decide this case de novo.
To the historical facts to which it would apply the law, however, the
Ninth Circuit panel would apply a clearly erroneous standard. The
district court's determination on issues such as the following would be
subject to a clear and convincing standard: is the child retarded!autistic/
findings that addressed this argument which appellant has not shown to be clearly
erroneous."). This apparent inconsistency within the circuit on the issue of what standard
to apply to a specfic type of factual application is not new to the Ninth Circuit. See Weiner,
supra note 131 at 1029-30.
140 727 F.2d at 815 n.5 (the court then held that the district court's factual determination
was clearly erroneous).
141 Weiner, supra note 131 at 1045; but see FED. R. Civ. P. 51 rejecting this position.
142 Weiner, The Civil Nonjury Trial and The Law-Fact Distinction, 55 CAUF. L. REv. 1020,
1046 (1967).
141 Stern, Review of Findings of Administrators, Judges and Juries: A Comparative
Analysis, 58 HARV. L. REv. 70, 113 (1944).
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deaf/etc.; does the child require instruction for more than the standard
school day; will the child benefit from home instruction; will the child
regress over summer and holiday breaks. If there is conflicting testimony,
the trial judge must decide the factual dispute and then apply the known
facts to the legal standard. The Ninth Circuit approach presumes there
are policy decisions that require the appellate court to perform the latter
function de novo.
Realistically, however, the legal application analysis is often the
functional equivalent of the historical fact determination. In many cases
it is the witnesses who are testifying as to the needs of the child. Experts
will testify, for example, that a particular placement will or will not
provide educational benefit. Issues of credibility and the like are as
important to this ultimate issue as to the more purely historical facts.
This lack of distinction is implicit in the rationale of the Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in its adoption of the clearly erroneous
standard of review. In Mathews v. Davis, 44 the Fourth Circuit affirmed
the decision of the district court holding that a school system's continued
funding of a residential placement was no longer necessary. In the words
of the appellate court:
We are of the opinion the finding of the district court was not
clearly erroneous FRCP 52(a). It saw some of the witnesses and
heard them testify. It had lived with the case through a multitude
of hearings, orders, etc., for a period of five years, and its
sensitive, systematic and thorough treatment of the parties and
issues in the case from beginning to end is a model. It was in a far
better position than are we to make an adjudication as to
whatever slight conflict there was in the evidence. 145
VI. CONCLUSION
Burdens of proof and standards of review can have a significant impact
on the outcome of proceedings brought under the EAHCA and deserve a
more consistently thoughtful approach than has been provided to date.
Any confusion that exists may well be the result of courts, including the
United States Supreme Court, failing to distinguish the various parts of
the administrative process. The simple step of looking realistically at the
administrative process rather than lumping together LEAs, SEAs, local
due process hearings, and state administrative appeals, as the Supreme
Court did in Rowley, would be a significant step. A reasoned approach
such as discussed above would be a significant improvement.
144 742 F.2d 825 (4th Cir. 1984).
145 Id. at 831; see also Hall v. Vance, 774 F.2d 1527 (4th Cir. 1985).
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